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STRIP SEARCHING IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLIND RACISM: THE DISPARATE IMPACT OF
FLORENCE V. BOARD OF CHOSEN FREEHOLDERS
OF THE COUNTY OF BURLINGTON
André Keeton*
In 2012, the Supreme Court of the United States decided Florence v.
Board of Chosen Freeholders of the County of Burlington.1 The Court
held that full strip searches, including cavity searches, are permissible regardless of
the existence of basic reasonable suspicion that the arrestee is in possession of con-
traband.2 Further, the Court held that law enforcement may conduct full strip
searches after arresting an individual for a minor offense and irrespective of the
circumstances surrounding the arrest.3 These holdings upended typical search juris-
prudence. Florence sanctions the overreach of state power and extends to law
enforcement and corrections officers the unfettered discretion to conduct graphically
invasive, suspicion-less strip searches.4
The Court’s dereliction of duty is enough to  concern all citizens. However,
the impact of this phenomenal lapse will not be felt equally in the age of what
Bonilla-Silva has termed colorblind racism.5 In 2013, in the case of Floyd v.
City of New York, Judge Shira A. Scheindlin found that between January
2004 and June 2012, the New York City Police Department (“NYPD”) made
4.4 million stops.6 She further found that more than eighty percent of these 4.4
* Associate Professor of Criminal Justice/Criminology at LaGuardia Community
College–City University of New York and former prosecutor for the District Attorney’s Office
in Bronx County, New York. I would like to thank Chairperson Lorraine Cohen and Professor
Lily Shohat for their support of my scholarship. I would also like to thank Assistant Professor
Colleen Eren for her assistance in the conceptualization of this piece.
1. Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of the Cnty. of Burlington, 132 S. Ct. 1510
(2012).
2. See id. at 1517-21.
3. See id. at 1512, 1526-27 (citing Atwater v. LagoVista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001), where the
Court determined that individuals arrested for traffic infractions could be arrested and jailed
absent a warrant or a serious [major] infraction).
4. See id. at 1516, 1523.
5. See EDUARDO BONILLA-SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS: COLOR-BLIND RA-
CISM AND THE PERSISTENCE OF RACIAL INEQUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 2006).
Bonilla-Silva coined the term colorblind racism in part to describe the post de jure or “legal”
oppression of African-Americans and the institution of the common de facto or “disparate out-
come” whereby African-Americans are disproportionately negatively affected as compared to
other racial and ethnic groups, particularly Whites. Id. at 2-4. As he states, “Whereas Jim Crow
racism explained blacks’ social standing as the result of their biological and moral inferiority,
color-blind racism avoids such facile arguments. Instead, whites rationalize minorities’ contem-
porary status as the product of market dynamics, naturally occurring phenomena, and blacks’
imputed cultural limitations.” Id.
6. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 556, 558 (2013).
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million stops were of Blacks or Hispanics.7 Specifically, Judge Scheindlin found
that in “52% of the 4.4 million stops, the person stopped was black, in 31% the
person [stopped] was Hispanic, and in 10% the person stopped was white.”8
This rate of stops and frisks is grossly disproportionate to Black and Hispanic
population representation in New York City and the United States in general.9
Further, as Judge Scheindlin astutely points out, “The NYPD’s policy of target-
ing ‘the right people’ for stops . . . is not directed toward the identification of a
specific perpetrator, rather, it is a policy of targeting expressly identified racial
groups for stops in general.”10 These findings make clear that Florence and color-
blind racism enable law enforcement to wage war against the civil rights of minority
citizens. This Article argues that the Court’s phenomenal lapse in Florence and
its general abdication of law enforcement oversight inevitably subjects minorities,
particularly Blacks and Latinos, to the blanket authority of law enforcement to
harass and humiliate based on perfunctory arrests predicated on the slightest of
infractions.
Other legal analyses of Florence have largely ignored, and hence mini-
mized, the salience of race when thinking about strip searches. In light of the
significant consequential impacts of this decision on minority populations, this over-
sight is itself unreasonable. This paper will analyze the rationale and policy impli-
cations, particularly for people of color, in light of Florence. Finally, I will also
propose policy recommendations to temper the projected negative impacts of the
decision.
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INTRODUCTION
The Court’s abdication of its power to oversee law enforcement poli-
cies is most obvious in the context of jails and prisons. Some deference to
administrative policies to ensure security in correctional facilities is neces-
sary. But these policies require restraint. Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court
recognizes that “a prisoner is not wholly stripped of his constitutional pro-
tections when imprisoned for crime.”11 Despite this proclamation, the
Court has historically exercised a deferential policy when it comes to jails
and prisons. Though the incarcerated theoretically retain basic constitu-
tional rights, the Court defers to the judgments made by jail and prison
administrators, even at the risk of undermining the constitutional rights of
arrestees and the incarcerated.12
Prior to the 1960s, this high degree of deference to correctional fa-
cilities led to numerous abuses of the constitutional rights of the incarcer-
ated.13 Since the 1960s, the Court has become more willing to intervene
in correctional settings.14 Still, the Court continues to exercise an expan-
sive degree of deference, largely allowing jails and prisons to operate with
autonomy.15
In Bell v. Wolfish (1979),16 the Court deferred to the expertise of
correctional facilities, upholding a blanket policy rule of conducting a vis-
ual search of the body cavities of every inmate that had contact with any
individual from outside the facility.17 More recently, in Florence v. Board of
Chosen Freeholders of the County of Burlington, the Court pronounced that
the severity of an offense and the reasonable suspicion standard do not
11. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555, 581, 593 (1974).
12. Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of the Cnty. of Burlington, 132 S. Ct. 1510,
1513-14 (2012).
13. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 598-600 (Douglas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
14. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (applying the Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment to state actions); Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546
(1964) (permitting incarcerated individuals to file federal claims for abuses of their constitutional
rights).
15. Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1513-14, 1523 (2012).
16. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
17. Id. at 520, 558.
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exempt any arrestee from strip searches prior to exposure to the general
population.18
The Court’s decision in Florence grants immense discretionary power
to the administrators of correctional facilities, and further diminishes the
reasonable suspicion standard and privacy interests of the incarcerated.19 It
will likely have disastrous consequences and embolden law enforcement,
particularly in their interactions with people of color. This Article seeks to
provide the perspective largely missing from other legal analyses of Florence
by examining strip search jurisprudence and law enforcement policies
under a socio-historical lens that recognizes society has entered into a pe-
riod of color-blind racism. This Article argues that the Court’s failure to
uphold a reasonable suspicion standard of possession of contraband (at a
minimum for minor infractions) in correctional settings will dispropor-
tionately impact communities of color.
Part I of this Article will analyze the Court’s precedent leading to
Florence, including Bell v. Wolfish (1979),20 Block v. Rutherford (1984),21
Hudson v. Palmer (1984),22 and Turner v. Safley (1987).23 Part II will review
the procedural and factual history of Florence and critique the Court’s ra-
tionale. Part III will analyze Florence in the context of the criminal justice
system and describe the past and potential future impacts of strip searches
on racial minorities. This section will also argue that a general policy of
strip-searching disadvantages minorities due to their overrepresentation at
every stage of the criminal justice process. Part IV proposes policy reforms
that can temper the growing, negative impact of the Florence decision on
communities of color.
I. THE EVOLVING STRIP SEARCH STANDARDS
In June 1968, the Supreme Court decided the case of Terry v. Ohio,24
a case that affirmed the constitutionality of what became known as “stop-
and-frisk” searches. In an opinion by Chief Justice Earl Warren, the Court
laid out a reasonable suspicion standard and decided that in the context of a
seizure and a search, “our inquiry is a dual one – whether the officer’s
action was justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably related
in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first
place.”25 The Court further stated:
18. Florence, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1518 (2012).
19. Id.
20. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
21. Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576 (1984).
22. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984).
23. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
24. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
25. Id. at 20-27.
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In order to assess the reasonableness of Officer McFadden’s
conduct as a general proposition, it is necessary ‘first to focus
upon the governmental interest which allegedly justifies official
intrusion upon the constitutionally protected interests of the
private citizen’ . . . for there is ‘no ready test for determining
reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search [or
seize] against the invasion which the search [or seizure]
entails.’26
The Court ultimately declared that the governmental interests of “effective
crime prevention and detection” necessitate that law enforcement be
granted flexibility in carrying out their duty to serve and protect.27 The
Court indicated that the Constitution allowed for some flexibility for law
enforcement to act between doing nothing and arrest.
The Court determined that in order for law enforcement to effec-
tively act to safeguard society and themselves, there should be a less de-
manding standard than probable cause available for law enforcement.
However, the Court acknowledged that “even a limited search of the outer
clothing for weapons constitutes a severe, though brief, intrusion upon
cherished personal security, and it must surely be an annoying, frighten-
ing, and perhaps humiliating experience.”28 Additionally, the Court
stated, “It is simply fantastic to urge that [a frisk] performed in public by a
policeman while the citizen stands helpless, perhaps facing a wall with his
hands raised, is a ‘petty indignity.’ ”29 For this reason, the Court deter-
mined that “in the absence of probable cause . . . [a search] . . . must, like
any other search, be strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify
its initiation. Thus, it must be limited to that which is necessary . . .”30
Despite these warnings and the Court’s recognition of the intrusion on
liberty inherent in any search and detention, in practice the standard of
reasonable suspicion for police work has extended beyond the mere search
for weapons to a general applicability in determining criminal wrongdoing
and the concealment of contraband.
Ultimately, the Court held that the reasonable suspicion standard is a
constitutional balance between governmental interests and the private in-
26. Id. at 20-21 (citing Camara v. Municipal Court of the City and Cnty. of San Fran-
cisco, 387 U.S. 523, 534-37 (1967)).
27. Id. at 22-27. The Court determined that “effective crime prevention and detection”
warranted greater flexibility in the carrying out of duties. Id. Pursuant to Terry, police officers
may conduct an investigatory stop and possible search if the officer could articulate facts indicat-
ing a reasonable belief that the detained party was engaged in criminal wrongdoing, if there was
no probable cause. Id. at 21.
28. Id. at 25-27. In the context of Terry, the Court was referring most specifically to the
concealment of weapons that could be used to injure police officers or third parties. Id. at 31-32.
29. Terry, 392 U.S. at 16-17.
30. Id. at 25-26 (citing Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310 (1967) (Fortas, J.,
concurring)).
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terests of individuals.31 The Court declared that a search is reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment “where a police officer observes unusual
conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience
that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is
dealing may be armed and presently dangerous . . . .”32
After Terry, the Court began to cede too much deference to correc-
tional institutions on the basis of maintaining order and safety and thereby
failed to engage in the proper analysis of competing concerns: governmen-
tal interest and privacy rights. The following cases illustrate the Court’s
overly deferential approach.
A. Bell v. Wolfish (1979)
The Fourth Amendment provides protection against “unreasonable
searches and seizures.”33 The debate over what constitutes a reasonable
search and/or seizure has driven much of Fourth Amendment analysis.
The Court has repeatedly stated that warrants are preferred.34 Neverthe-
less, since Terry, the Court has extended those instances in which law en-
forcement are allowed to forego the warrant requirement.35 Within this
framework, the starting point for an examination of the Court’s legal stan-
dards as concerns strip search jurisprudence is Bell v. Wolfish.36
In Bell, the Court deferred to correctional institution administrators,
even at the behest of individual privacy.37 The Court characterized the
case as “requiring us to examine the constitutional rights of pretrial detain-
ees—those persons who have been charged with a crime but who have not
yet been tried on the charge.”38 “Those persons” constituted a class action
of pre-trial detainees and sentenced persons at the Metropolitan Correc-
31. Id. at 27.
32. Id. at 30-31.
33. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”).
34. Terry, 392 U.S. at 20 (“We do not retreat from our holdings that the police must,
whenever practicable, obtain advance judicial approval of searches and seizures through the war-
rant procedure . . . .”).
35. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (holding that incident to a
lawful arrest, a warrantless search of the arrestee is a reasonable exercise of police authority in
order to protect police safety); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969) (holding that
incident to a lawful arrest, a warrantless search of the area immediately within the arrestees reach
is constitutionally permissible); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967) (holding that
when exigency demands, the police are not authorized to obtain a warrant, especially when their
lives or the lives of third parties are threatened).
36. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
37. Id. at 556-57.
38. Id. at 520, 523.
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tional Center.39 They challenged the conditions of their confinement pur-
suant to Bureau of Prisons facilities’ policies.40 One controversial policy
required detainees and sentenced prisoners to submit to invasive visual cav-
ity searches “after every contact visit with a person from outside the
institution.”41
The district court for the Southern District of New York enjoined
many of the challenged practices, including the cavity search require-
ment.42 The district court held that this strip search procedure was uncon-
stitutional in light of Terry “absent probable cause to believe that the
inmate is concealing contraband.”43 Additionally, the district court held
that detained inmates are “presumed to be innocent and held only to en-
sure their presence at trial” and that “ ‘any deprivation or restriction of . . .
rights beyond those which are necessary for confinement alone must be
justified by a compelling necessity.’ ”44 The Court of Appeals affirmed the
district court’s prohibition of the use of cavity searches.45
The Supreme Court reversed. While maintaining that inmates retain
Constitutional rights,46 the Court determined that reasonableness “re-
quires a balancing of the need for the particular search against the invasion
of personal rights that the search entails.”47 After engaging in this balanc-
ing,48 the Court found that the uniqueness and the security concerns of a
detention facility49 require that the balance be struck in favor of the
knowledge, skill, and expertise of the facility administrators, not in favor of
the privacy of individual inmates.50 Unlike the district and appellate




41. Id. at 520, 527-28.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 558.
44. Id. at 520, 527-28.
45. Id. at 530.
46. Id. at 545 (“[C]onvicted prisoners do not forfeit all constitutional protections by rea-
son of their conviction and confinement in prison. There is no iron curtain drawn between the
Constitution and the prisons of this country.”) (internal citations omitted).
47. Id. at 559.
48. Id. To determine reasonableness, the Court’s analysis considered four factors: (1) the
scope of the particular intrusion, (2) the manner in which the intrusion is conducted, (3) the
justification for initiating the intrusion, and (4) the place of the intrusion. Id.
49. Id. at 558-60 (finding that the smuggling of money, drugs, weapons, and other con-
traband is all too common an occurrence).
50. Id. at 545-48, 565.
51. Id. at 559-60.
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In Bell, the Court focuses on whether the strip search was “reasona-
bly related to legitimate governmental (penological) interests.”52 In doing
so, the Court began a process of relaxing the standard of reasonable suspi-
cion first articulated in Terry. Today, the Court gives great deference to
correctional institutions.  Within the four-part Bell framework, this defer-
ence always weighs in favor of security over individual privacy rights.53 As
a result, the Court fails to wholly consider the Fourth Amendment rights
of the incarcerated, detained, and other suspects. In the end, this regime of
deference disproportionately disadvantages racial and ethnic minorities in
the criminal justice system.
B. Block v. Rutherford (1984)
The Court applied the rule of deference implied in Bell when re-
viewing rules and regulations within the correctional context. For exam-
ple, in Block v. Rutherford,54 the Court decided whether Los Angeles
County Central Jail pretrial detainees have a constitutional right to observe
searches of their prison cells by correctional officials.55 Pretrial detainees
challenged other “policies and practices and conditions of their confine-
ment.”56 Specifically, the detainees challenged the policies of (1) “contact
visits with their spouses, relatives, children, and friends” and (2) the policy
of “irregularly scheduled shakedown searches of individual cells in the ab-
sence of the cell occupants.”57 Agreeing with respondents, the district
court found that “the ability of a man to embrace his wife and children
from time to time during the weeks or months while he is awaiting trial is
a matter of great importance.”58 Though security is an immediate con-
cern, the district court held that correctional facility policies should be
“least restrictive” and take into account different security concerns for
those inmates considered low and high risk, thus allowing for a more indi-
vidualized assessment of each inmate rather than a blanket generally appli-
cable standard.59 Contrary to the deference espoused in Bell, the district
court also held that disallowing inmates from watching cell inspections was
an unreasonable institutional balancing of individual inmate’s interests in
personal space and property and security concerns.60
52. Id. at 552.
53. Id. at 520, 561-63.
54. Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576 (1984).
55. Id. at 577.
56. Id. at 578.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 578.
59. Id. at 578-79 (The District Court found that inmates with low-risk classifications and
those incarcerated longer than two weeks had a constitutional right to contact.).
60. Id. at 579.
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Interestingly, while this case was being heard in the district court, the
U.S. Supreme Court decided Bell.61 The deferential language towards the
skill and expertise of correctional administration officials from Bell seems
to err against a finding for the inmates in Block. However, even in light of
the holding in Bell, the district court did not defer to correctional facility
policies in Block.62
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding that, though
correctional facilities had significant security concerns, “the psychological
and punitive effects which prolonged loss of contact visitation has upon
detainees” made a blanket prohibition of contact visits an “unreasonable,
exaggerated response to security concerns.”63
The well-considered and balanced approach to penal interests on the
one hand and the due process and individual interests on the other by the
lower courts in Block adheres to the Supreme Court’s assertion that “[a]
prisoner is not wholly stripped of his constitutional protections” when im-
prisoned for a crime.”64 Both the district court and the Court of Appeals
acknowledged that correctional institutions have a unique function in our
society and that due deference should be paid.65 However, these courts
recognized not only the due process concerns inherent in the arguments of
the inmates, but also the privacy concerns. As a result, they sought a rea-
sonable constitutional balance to mitigate their concerns.
Applying Bell,66 the Supreme Court reversed. Rather than consider
the rights of the incarcerated, the Court focused on governmental inter-
ests. Specifically, the Court determined that the correctional facilities’ pol-
icies are constitutional because they were reasonable in light of the
governmental goal of security.67 Further, the Court indicated that as long
as the correctional facility’s policies and regulations did not constitute pun-
ishment of the pretrial detainees,68 “administrators [are to be afforded]
wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and
practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and
discipline and to maintain institutional security.”69 The Court reiterated
61. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
62. Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 580-81(1984) (The district court in Block was
specifically instructed on remand to consider the Bell decision when reviewing an inmate’s inter-
est and the burden on the prison. The district court affirmed its prior decision in favor of the
inmate, reasoning that the institution’s policies were “excessive.”).
63. Id. at 582.
64. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 540 (1974).
65. Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 578-82, 585 (1984).
66. Bell, 441 U.S. at 559 (To determine reasonableness, the Court’s analysis considered
four factors: (1) the scope of the particular intrusion, (2) the manner in which the intrusion is
conducted, (3) the justification for initiating the intrusion, and (4) the place of the intrusion.).
67. Block, 468 U.S. at 586.
68. Id. at 584.
69. Id. at 585 (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979)).
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that in the absence of arbitrariness or punitive action, it would be much
more likely to acquiesce to correctional administrators;70 “that this is a
matter lodged in the sound discretion of the institutional officials.”71
C. Hudson v. Palmer (1984)
The Court further disregarded inmates’ rights and privacy interests in
Hudson v. Palmer.72 In Hudson, the Court considered whether inmates have
a reasonable expectation of privacy in their individual cells under the
Fourth Amendment.73
During a routine search of an inmate’s cell, correctional officers dis-
covered a ripped pillow case in a trash can next to his bed.74 The inmate
was charged with destroying the pillowcase and subsequently found guilty
of destruction of state property.75 Among other complaints, the inmate
argued that the search of his cell violated his constitutional right to pri-
vacy.76 The district court found in favor of the correctional officer.77
However, the Supreme Court found that searches conducted solely to har-
ass or to humiliate were not covered by the Bell reasonableness framework
and thus violated a “limited privacy interest.”78
The Court of Appeals found that “while persons imprisoned for
crime enjoy many protections of the Constitution, it is clear that impris-
onment carries with it the circumscription or loss of many significant
rights.”79 This holding declared that in the correctional context, the con-
tours of the Fourth Amendment require that “the person invoking its pro-
tection can claim a ‘justifiable,’ a ‘reasonable,’ or a ‘legitimate expectation
of privacy’ that has been invaded by government action.”80 In short, pur-
70. Id. at 584.
71. Id. at 591 (“reaffirm[ing] that ‘proper deference to the informed discretion of prison
authorities demands that they, and not the courts, make the difficult judgments which reconcile
conflicting claims affecting the security of the institution, the welfare of the prison staff, and the
property rights of detainees.’”).
72. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984).
73. Id. at 519.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 519-20.
76. Id. at 520.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 522.
79. Id. at 524.
80. Id. at 524-25.
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suant to Katz,81 “a prisoner’s expectation of privacy in his prison cell is the
kind of expectation that ‘society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.’ ”82
In reversing, the Supreme Court found for correctional institu-
tions.83 The Court held, for the first time, that inmates have no reasonable
expectation of privacy in their individual cells. In so doing, the Court
deprived incarcerated citizens of any Fourth Amendment protections
against searches, holding wholesale that there is no “proscription against
unreasonable searches . . . within the confines of the prison cell.”84 In
deciding that irregular, non-scheduled, suspicion-less searches were consti-
tutionally permissible, the Court solidified its previous determination that
the time, manner, and scope of searches are left to the determination of
correctional institution administrators.85 Again, when considering the
right of individual inmates to privacy as compared with those of correc-
tional facility administrators to security and order, the Court focused on
the latter.86 The Court may have sought to “strike the balance,”87 but it
made clear that institutional security goals are sacrosanct, thereby jeopard-
izing individual rights.
D. Turner v. Safley (1987)
Turner v. Safley88 required the Court to decide whether the reasona-
bleness standard was to be the sine qua non of correctional facility analysis
or whether there were certain burdens upon fundamental rights that re-
quired a heightened level of scrutiny.89
Inmates detained by the Missouri Division of Corrections (MDC)
challenged the MDC regulations relating to correspondence exchanges as
unconstitutional.90 Specifically, the inmates objected to the regulation
prohibiting correspondence between inmates of different institutions un-
less the correspondence was (1) with family members who were also incar-
cerated, (2) related to legal matters involving both inmates, or (3) approved
81. In Katz, the Court was called upon to decide whether the Fourth Amendment’s
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures protected individuals in making private
phone calls from a public telephone booth. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). The
Court determined that (1) The government’s placing of a listening device on the outside of the
phone booth constituted a violation of privacy and a violation of search and seizure and (2) that
prior to placing listening devices, warrants are required. Id. at 360-61 (Harlan, J., concurring).
82. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525 (1984) (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 361).
83. Id. at 525-26
84. Id. at 521-22, 526.
85. Id. at 527 (citing Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 823 (1974)) (explaining that “insti-
tutional security is central to all other goals”).
86. Id. at 526-27.
87. Id. at 527.
88. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
89. Id. at 85.
90. Id. at 81.
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by a “classification/treatment team” and “deemed to be in the best interest
of the parties involved.”91
The District Court ruled that the regulation amounted to a practice
that “inmates may not write non-family inmates.”92 Applying a “strict
scrutiny standard,” the district court found the correspondence regulation
was unconstitutionally broad and consequently enjoined the MDC from
enforcing it.93 Indicating that the correctional officials could have chosen a
less restrictive means of addressing any security concerns,94 the district
court decided that the correspondence regulations were “applied in an ar-
bitrary and capricious manner.”95
The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court appro-
priately applied strict scrutiny and that the correspondence regulation
could be sustained “only if it furthers an important or substantial govern-
mental interest unrelated to the suppression of expression, and the limita-
tion is no greater than necessary or essential to protect that interest.”96
The Supreme Court reversed.97 The Court observed that “in none
of these four ‘prisoners’ rights’ cases did the Court apply a standard of
heightened scrutiny, but instead inquired whether a prison regulation that
burdens fundamental rights is ‘reasonably related’ to legitimate penological
objectives, or whether it represents an ‘exaggerated response’ to those con-
cerns.”98 The application of this lesser standard allowed the Court to find
that the correspondence restrictions by the MDC were related to “legiti-
mate security interests” and were thus constitutional.99 Turner is yet an-
other example of the Court’s continued deference to the judgment and
practice of correctional institutions.
II. FLORENCE V. BOARD OF CHOSEN FREEHOLDERS OF THE
COUNTY OF BURLINGTON (2012)
In Florence, the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment
does not require that prison officials possess “reasonable suspicion” when
91. Id. at 81-82.
92. Id. at 82.
93. Id. at 83.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. (explaining that the Eighth Circuit concluded that the regulations failed to satisfy
the strict scrutiny standard because they “w[ere] not the least restrictive means of achieving the
asserted goals of rehabilitation and security”).
97. Id. at 84 (affirming that in discussing the principles framing prisoners’ constitutional
claims, federal courts must take cognizance of the valid constitutional claims of prison inmates
and that courts are ill-equipped to deal with the increasingly urgent problems of prison adminis-
tration and reform).
98. Id. at 87.
99. Id. at 91.
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determining whether to strip search individuals.100 The Court, in a final
show of deference to correctional institutions at the expense of individual
rights, found that the strip search procedures at the Burlington and Essex
facilities were permitted unless the inmate or the accused could demon-
strate with substantial evidence that the procedure was an “exaggerated
response” to the issues of security.101 Absent this showing, the Court
found that the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement does not
prohibit implementation of general strip search procedures and that the
practice of strip searching every inmate “struck a reasonable balance be-
tween inmate privacy and the needs of the institutions.”102 The Court’s
understanding of the facts in Florence, its rationale, and the practical conse-
quences of its decision represent dangerous jurisprudence in the age of
colorblind racism.
A. The District Court’s Findings of Fact and Holdings
The facts of Florence were undisputed. On March 3, 2005, the New
Jersey State Police stopped Albert Florence, an African-American male,
and his wife while she was driving him in his SUV on Interstate Highway
295 in Burlington County, New Jersey.103 The New Jersey State Trooper
directed him to exit his vehicle and then placed him under arrest for an
expired warrant that had been issued on April 25, 2003.104 The warrant
charged Florence with a non-indictable variety of civil contempt.105
Though initially valid, Florence had paid off the civil penalties prior to this
arrest.106 Despite Florence’s protests, the state trooper arrested him and
transported him to Burlington County Jail.107
Once he arrived at the jail, Albert Florence alleged he was subjected
to a mandatory strip and body cavity search.108 Despite the fact that the
underlying charges were for nonviolent, non-indictable civil contempt,
Florence was required to “remove all his clothing and, while nude, open
his mouth, lift his tongue, hold his arms out, turn fully around, and lift his
genitals.”109 Six days later, officials from the Essex County Sheriff’s De-
100. Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of the Cnty. of Burlington, 132 S. Ct. 1510,
1523 (2012).
101. Id. at 1510, 1512-14.
102. Id. at 1510, 1523.
103. Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of the Cnty. of Burlington, 595 F. Supp. 2d
492, 495-96 (D.N.J. 2009); see also Adam Liptak, No Crime, but an Arrest and Two Strip-Searches,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 7, 2011), www.nytimes.com/2011/03/08/us/08bar.html?r=0.




108. Id. at 496-97.
109. Id.
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partment arrived to transport Florence to the Essex Jail.110 Upon his arri-
val, Florence alleged that he was subjected to another mandatory full body
search as well as a cavity search when he was processed.111 Following this,
Florence was placed in general population.112
Florence sued, arguing the strip searches were violations of constitu-
tional law.  Specifically, Florence argued that “the undisputed facts estab-
lish that Defendants’ policy of strip-searching all arrestees without
individualized suspicion is a violation of clearly established constitutional
law.”113 Florence and those in his class (“arrestees charged with non-in-
dictable offenses who were [strip searched by officers] . . . without the
officers first articulating a reasonable belief that those arrestees were con-
cealing contraband, drugs or weapons”) moved for summary judgment on
the grounds that the practices of the Burlington and Essex jail facilities
unconstitutionally violated their rights.114 The plaintiffs claimed that strip-
searching without reasonable suspicion or individualized suspicion was a
violation of clearly established law.115 The Burlington and Essex jails
sought dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claims and stated that “visual observation/
strip search policies are constitutional.”116
When considering whether the jails’ actions were reasonable, the dis-
trict court considered and applied the jail’s written policies and normal
practices. First, the district court stipulated that the Burlington Jail’s poli-
cies and procedures defined a strip search as “a physical search of an inmate
. . . while unclothed consisting of routine and systematic visual observation
of the inmate’s physical body to look for distinguished identifying marks,
scars or deformities, signs of illness, injury or disease and/or the conceal-
ment of contraband on the inmate’s body.”117 The district court further
110. Id. at 497.
111. Id. (Florence testified that he and four other arrestees were told to “enter separate
shower stalls, strip all their clothing and shower” while being watched by two other officers.
Florence also testified that once showered, he was “directed to open his mouth and lift his
genitals, . . . [and then] ordered to turn . . . away from the officers . . . squat and cough . . . .”)
(internal citations omitted).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 500-01.
114. Id. at 495-96, 500.
115. Id. at 500-01. Florence and others similarly situated brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim
alleging violation of their constitutional rights and seeking injunctive relief. Id. The plaintiffs
claim that both Burlington and Essex officials “ ‘admit that every unnamed class member . . . has
been ordered’ to completely disrobe and stand nude upon admission to the jail facilities, ‘without
[said officials] first articulating a reasonable basis to do so.’” Id. at 500. Plaintiffs further allege
that, “at minimum, individualized reasonable suspicion for weapons, drugs, or other contraband
must first exist before a jail official may strip search anyone charged with a non-indictable of-
fense.” Id.
116. Id. at 496, 501.
117. Id. at 497 (citing Burlington Jail’s Policies and Procedures: Search of Inmates—No.
Section 1186) (internal citation omitted).
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stipulated that Burlington Jail’s policy indicates that “ ‘a person who has
been detained or arrested for commission of an offense other than a crime
. . . shall not be subject to a strip-search unless there is a reasonable suspicion
that a weapon, controlled dangerous substance or contraband will be
found.’ ”118
The district court also determined that the Burlington Jail policy in-
dicated that “arrestees for non-indictable offenses, such as civil contempt
(Florence’s warrant charge), should not be strip searched.”119 However,
the district court also noted the jail allowed for “a visual observation [of
all inmates] irrespective of whether they are [detained on] indictable or
non-indictable [charges].”120
The district court explained that the Essex County Correctional Fa-
cility’s policies and procedures in effect at the time in question required
that “upon arrival at the Essex Jail, all arrestees shall be strip searched and
then required to shower.”121 The court noted that the facility required “an
arrestee [to] undress completely . . . while officers carefully observe.”122
Under the facility’s procedures in place at the time, officers were to “ex-
amine the interior of the arrestee’s mouth; his or her ears, nose, hair and
scalp; his or her fingers, hands, arms and armpits; and all body openings
and the inner thighs.”123 The court noted that April 2005, not long after
Florence was transported and held at the facility, the jail reformed its pol-
icy and “facially prohibit[ed] strip searching non-indictable arrestees in
118. Id. (emphasis added).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 498-99. According to the testimony of Officer Haywood Reeder, an employee
of the Burlington facility since 1990, a strip search is defined as “searching various parts of a nude
inmates body for contraband, scars, marks, or tattoos,” whereas “a visual observation includes:
(1) checking a nude arrestee for scars, marks, and tattoos while he strips for a mandatory shower;
(2) instructing the nude arrestee on the application of a delousing agent; and (3) instructing the
nude arrestee to change into jail clothing following his shower.” Id. at 498. Warden Juel Cole, an
employee of the Burlington facility since 1976, “confirmed that an arrestee admitted for a non-
indictable offense is subjected to a visual observation, which involves an officer ‘mak[ing] a
quick check’ on a nude inmate while he changes clothing or during his shower for bruises,
tattoos, or ‘any item like that of any importance.’” Id. at 499. The District Court found that
“according to Warden Cole, a visual observation of an arrestee’s nude body does not constitute a
‘search’ under the Burlington Jail’s definition of that term.” Id.
121. Id. at 499.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 499-500 (citing Dep’t of Public Safety: General Order No. 89-17). Warden
Larry Glover testified about intake procedures at the facility, stating that “for intake processing
purposes, all arrestees are treated the same, without any distinction based on whether the arrestee
is accused of an indictable or a non-indictable offense.” Id. at 499. According to Sergeant
Thomas Logue, “[O]fficers call up to three arrestees at a time to enter the shower area during
processing. Once there, corrections officers direct the arrestees to remove their clothing and
place them into gray bins. The arrestees then simultaneously undress while the officers view their
nude bodies.” Id. at 500 (internal citations omitted).
70 Michigan Journal of Race & Law [VOL. 21:55
the absence of reasonable suspicion that the search will produce weapons,
drugs, or contraband.”124
The district court held that an order to “take off all your clothes” is,
at its essence, a strip search and that calling this “a visual observation is a
matter of semantics.”125 The court reasoned that “if the less intrusive Bur-
lington procedure constitutes a search for purposes of the Fourth Amend-
ment, it follows that the more-intrusive Essex procedure also constitutes a
search.”126 The court returned to the Supreme Court’s analytical frame-
work in Bell that purported to balance “the need for the particular search
against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails.”127 While
acknowledging that the Fourth Amendment prohibits only unreasonable
searches and seizures, the district court emphasized that Bell requires a very
careful balancing of the “significant and legitimate interests of the institu-
tion against the privacy interests of the inmates.”128
Ultimately, the district court determined that the procedures at Bur-
lington and Essex are not constitutionally reasonable within the parameters
established by Bell.129 It distinguished the Bell searches, which the Supreme
Court had deemed reasonable from the blanket strip searches.130 The dis-
trict court stressed that the searches in Bell “were conducted after contact
visits with outside visitors, during which time exposure to contraband is
heightened. [These] visits, by their very nature, may then provide the
requisite reasonable suspicion for jail officers to justify the blanket search
policy.”131
The district court found that a blanket policy of strip searching under
particular circumstances may be constitutional provided it is supported by
the balancing test set forward in Bell.132 It found that both jail’s procedures
were impermissibly humiliating, involving a “complete disrobing, exami-
nation of the nude inmates body, followed by a supervised shower . . . in
the presence of other inmates (further contributing to the humiliating and
degrading nature of the experience).”133
124. Id. at 499 (citing Dep’t of Public Safety: General Order No. 04-06) (emphasis added).
125. Id. at 503.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 504 (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 558, 559 (1979)). To determine reasona-
bleness, the Court’s analysis considered four factors: (1) the scope of the particular intrusion, (2)
the manner in which the intrusion is conducted, (3) the justification for initiating the intrusion,
and (4) the place of the intrusion. Id.
128. Id. (citing Bell, 441 U.S. at 559).
129. Id. at 511-12.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 509.
132. Id. at 509-10.
133. Id. at 512.
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Most importantly, the district court found that the existence of the
blanket, general strip search policy in question leads to unjust results.134
Given that both facilities perform strip searches “without distinction be-
tween indictable and non-indictable offenders,”135 the district court rea-
soned that “a priest or minister arrested for allegedly skimming the Sunday
collection would be subjected to the same degrading procedure as a gang-
member arrested on an allegation of drug charges.”136 Further, the district
court found the intrusive nature of the searches to which Florence and his
class were subjected were unreasonable, despite agreeing with officials from
both facilities that if “reasonable suspicion exists” nothing prohibits such
searches.137
From the district court’s perspective, conducting general or blanket
strip searches without articulable reasonable suspicion— that is, without
distinction between severity of offense, attention to the dignity of the in-
mates and the sensitivity of such an invasive exercise, or exploration of
procedures less intrusive to accomplish the stated security goals—violates
the Fourth Amendment.138 In short, “the search policies at issue fail the
Bell balancing test.”139
B. The Third Circuit Rules in Favor of Burlington and Essex
The Third Circuit reversed based on its interpretation that the Su-
preme Court precedent required deference to the correctional facilities’
judgment.140 The Third Circuit held that (1) security interests of the facili-
ties trumped the rights of the individual inmates, (2) the searches were not
so intrusive as to violate Bell, and (3) promoting equal treatment of inmates
trumped the district court’s determination that indicted and non-indicted




137. Id. at 512-14.
138. Id. at 512.
139. Id. at 513.
140. Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of the Cnty. of Burlington, 621 F.3d 296,
298-99, 302 (3d Cir. 2010) (“In Bell, the Supreme Court rejected a Fourth Amendment chal-
lenge to a policy of visual body cavity searches for all detainees—regardless of the reason for their
incarceration—after contact visits with outsiders. The Court applied a balancing test and con-
cluded that the visual body cavity searches were reasonable because the prison’s security interest
justified the intrusion into the detainees’ privacy.”) (internal citations omitted).
141. Id. at 296 (See Judge Hardiman’s opinion for the Third Circuit in which he states that
the strip search policies of the jails were reasonable and in compliance with the Court’s holding
in Bell and not in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Further, Judge Hardiman enumerates the
rationales for reversing the district court’s finding that blanket strip searches without articulable
suspicion do not comply with Bell. The above summarized holdings reflect the Third Circuit’s
reasoning.).
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The Third Circuit reached this result even while reciting the Su-
preme Court’s maxim that “prisons are not beyond the reach of the Con-
stitution.”142 It did so by echoing the Court in Hudson, noting that
detention “‘carries with it the circumscription or loss of many significant
rights’”143 and that “[t]he curtailment of certain rights is necessary, as a
practical matter, to accommodate a myriad of institutional needs and
objectives of prison facilities, chief among which is internal security.”144
In holding that security outweighs arguments of individual constitutional
due process and privacy, the Third Circuit reinforced the increasing belief
that prisons are beyond judicial inquiry: “[T]he Supreme Court . . . has
also emphasized that the judiciary has a ‘very limited role’ in the adminis-
tration of detention facilities.”145
Though Florence and his co-plaintiffs never argued that the purpose
of detention facilities was detainment and not correctional, the Court of
Appeals repeatedly reiterated the correctional nature of prisons. It stated
that “[l]oss of freedom of choice and privacy are inherent incidents of
confinement in such a facility.”146 Moreover, it noted that “[a] prison is
not a summer camp and prison officials have the unenviable task of pre-
serving order in difficult circumstances.”147 This reasoning continues to
further diminish the individual rights of inmates and detainees and further
immunizes correctional facilities from judicial oversight.
In ruling in favor of the County of Burlington, the Third Circuit
reinforced the notion that the Fourth Amendment’s requirement of indi-
vidualized reasonable suspicion does not apply in the context of invasive
visual and strip searches, even for non-indictable, low-risk offenders. The
court ultimately declared: “In sum, balancing the Jail’s security interests at
the time of intake before arrestees enter the general population against the
privacy interests of the inmates, we hold that the strip search procedures
described by the District Court at BCJ (“Burlington County Jail”) and (“Es-
sex County Correctional Facility”) are reasonable.”148
C. U.S. Supreme Court Affirms the Third Circuit
In Justice Kennedy’s opinion, the Supreme Court affirmed the Third
Circuit’s decision, finding that blanket strip search policies, including inva-
sive visual and/or body cavity searches, strike the proper balance between
142. Id. at 302 (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 523-24 (1984)).
143. Id. at 301 (internal citations omitted).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 302 (quoting Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 584 (1984)).
146. Id. (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 537 (1979)).
147. Id. at 307-08 (quoting E.E.O.C. v. The GEO Group, Inc., 616 F.3d 265, 275 (3d
Cir. 2010)).
148. Id. at 311.
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inmate privacy and the needs of correctional facilities.149 The Court found
that Florence failed to provide “substantial evidence” that the strip search
policies enforced by the Burlington and Essex jails “[were] an unnecessary
or unjustified response to problems of jail security.”150 Further, the Court
determined that such procedures do not offend the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, and that there is no constitutional
requirement to distinguish between serious and minor offenses.151
The Court maintained its pattern of deference to the correctional
facilities, explaining that “[t]he task of determining whether a policy is
reasonably related to legitimate security interests is peculiarly within the
province and professional expertise of corrections officials.”152 The Court
established the procedural and substantive lodestar for correctional facilities
in determining that when correctional officials intrude on the rights of
inmates, these rights must give way to regulations “reasonably related to
legitimate penological interests.”153
Turning to Bell, the Court stated that “there is no mechanical way to
determine whether intrusions on an inmate’s privacy are reasonable”154
and that “[t]he need for a particular search must be balanced against the
resulting invasion of personal rights.”155 The Court explained that at-
tempting to determine minor as opposed to serious offenses would be “a
difficult if not impossible task.”156 Having abandoned concern for individ-
ual rights, the Court turned its attention to the interests of correction offi-
cials, stating, “Correctional officials have a significant interest in
conducting a thorough search as a standard part of the intake process. The
admission of inmates creates numerous risks for facility staff . . . .”157 The
Court pointed to the “introduc[tion] of lice or contagious infections”
and/or “wounds or other injuries” to argue that “[i]t may be difficult to
identify and treat these problems until detainees remove their clothes for a
visual inspection.”158 The Court claimed that intake is the place where
149. Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of the Cnty. of Burlington, 132 S. Ct. 1510,
1523 (2012).
150. Id. at 1513-14.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 1510, 1517 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 548 (1979)).
153. Id. at 1515-16 (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)).
154. Id. at 1516 (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979)). Bell established reasona-
bleness as hinging on “the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted,
the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 529.
155. Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of the Cnty. of Burlington, 132 S. Ct. 1510,
1516 (2012).
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1518 (quoting Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 587 (1984)).
158. Id. at 1518 (citing PRISON AND JAIL ADMINISTRATION: PRACTICE AND THEORY
(Carlson & Garrett eds., 2d ed. 2008)).
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“jails and prisons face grave threats posed by the increasing number of gang
members who go through the intake process.”159
Florence acknowledged precedent and only objected to the applica-
tion of invasive strip searches to detainees who have “not been arrested for
a serious crime or for any offense involving a weapon or drugs” as consti-
tutionally unreasonable.160 The Court rejected his argument in stating that
“[p]eople detained for minor offenses can turn out to be the most devious
and dangerous criminals.”161 Indeed, this statement tended to criminalize
people who come into contact with law enforcement.
In determining that Florence and those similarly situated should not
be segregated from the more dangerous arrestees at intake, the Court
painted a dangerous and unsubstantiated picture of the population that
comes into contact with law enforcement. It stated that “people arrested
for minor offenses have tried to smuggle prohibited items into jail, some-
times by using their rectal cavities or genitals for the concealment.”162 The
Court further noted that “[e]ven if people arrested for minor offenses do
not themselves wish to introduce contraband into a jail, they may be co-
erced into doing so by others.”163 The Court imagined this population as
weak and vulnerable, stating “a hardened criminal or gang member can, in
just a few minutes, approach the person and coerce him into hiding the
fruits of a crime, a weapon, or some other contraband.”164 Additionally,
the Court held that officers’ jobs would become more difficult if they were
required “to classify inmates by their current and prior offenses before the
intake search.”165 Further, “under [Florence’s] proposed regime, officers
would be required, in a few minutes to determine whether any of the
underlying offenses were serious enough to authorize the more invasive
search protocol.”166
159. Id. at 1518-19 (citing the Policeman’s Benevolent Association and the New Jersey
Commission of Investigation in concluding that “[g]ang rivalries spawn a climate of tension,
violence, and coercion”). The Court explains that “[gangs] recruit [new] members by force,
engage in assaults against staff, and give other inmates a reason to arm themselves.” Id. at 1518.
As the Court asserts, “Fights among feuding gangs can be deadly, and the officers who must
maintain order are put in harm’s way.” Id. at 1518-19. For these reasons, the Court determined
that “the identification and isolation of gang members before they are admitted protects every-
one in the facility.” Id. at 1519.
160. Id. at 1520.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 1521 (citing Brief of Amicus Curiae New Jersey County Jail Wardens Assoc. in
Support of Respondents at 16, Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of the Cnty. of Burling-
ton, 132 S. Ct. 1510 (2012) (No.10-945)); cf. Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 587 (1984)
(“It is not unreasonable to assume, for instance, that low security risk detainees would be enlisted
to help obtain contraband or weapons by their fellow inmates who are denied contact visits.”).
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1522.
FALL 2015] Strip Searching 75
Justice Kennedy was less concerned with the individual rights of pe-
titioners than he was with the morale of jail and prison officials. He wrote,
“The officials in charge of the jails in this case urge the Court to reject any
complicated constitutional scheme requiring them to conduct less thor-
ough inspections of some detainees . . . .”167 The Court argued that
though the scheme proposed by Florence “would limit the intrusion on
the privacy of some detainees,”168 this increased privacy “would be at the
risk of increased danger to everyone in the facility, including the less seri-
ous offenders themselves.”169
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito wrote in concurrence with
the majority,170 but stressed that the Court was not foreclosing the possi-
bility of a situation arising in which a strip search of an arrestee would be
considered unreasonable.171 The disparity between the majority and the
concurrence is significant.
Chief Justice Roberts acknowledged the need to “not embarrass the
future,”172 while proceeding to do just that by endorsing the strip search-
ing of a man arrested on an invalidly sustained bench warrant.173 Further,
Justice Alito hesitated to vilify detained citizens, stating that “[m]ost of
those arrested for minor offenses are not dangerous . . . . For these persons,
admission to the general jail population, with the concomitant humiliation
of a strip search, may not be reasonable, particularly if an alternative proce-
dure is feasible.”174 However, while saying that the Court “does not hold
that it is always reasonable to conduct a full strip search of an arrestee
whose detention has not been reviewed by a judicial officer and who could
be held in available facilities apart from the general population,”175 the
concurring justices proceeded to endorse a majority opinion which did
just that.176 Nonetheless, the concurrence suggests some possibility of a
factual scenario wherein the Court would decide in favor of individual
privacy over institutional security concerns. But, given that no factual sce-
nario has been adequate so far, the forecast is bleak.
167. Id. (Florence proposed that the Court adopt a scheme rooted in reasonable suspicion
or require corrections officials to consider factors such as the detainee’s behavior, suspected of-
fense, or criminal history before permitting a strip search.).
168. Id.
169. Id. at 1513.
170. Id. at 1523 (Roberts, C.J., concurring); id. at 1524-25 (Alito, J., concurring).
171. Id. at 1523 (Roberts, C.J., concurring); id. at 1524-25 (Alito, J., concurring).
172. Id. at 1523 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (quoting Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minne-
sota, 322 U.S. 292, 300 (1944)).
173. Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of the Cnty. of Burlington, 595 F. Supp. 2d
492, 495-96 (D.N.J. 2009).
174. Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1524 (Alito, J., concurring).
175. Id. (emphasis omitted).
176. Id. at 1523 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
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Small consolation for Albert Florence is found in a dissenting opin-
ion by Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Ka-
gan.177 Reviewing the facts, Justice Breyer observed the unusual
invasiveness of the strip search conducted by Burlington County jails.”178
Justice Breyer indicated that “the searches here involve close observation of
the private areas of a person’s body and for that reason constitute a far
more serious invasion of that person’s privacy.”179 Ultimately, Justice
Breyer would hold that “a search of an individual arrested for a minor
offense that does not involve drugs or violence . . . is an ‘unreasonable
search’ forbidden by the Fourth Amendment unless prison authorities have
reasonable suspicion to believe that the individual possesses drugs or other
contraband.”180
Justice Breyer placed the question at issue in a larger context, stating,
“The constitutional right at issue here is the Fourth Amendment right to
be free of ‘unreasonable searches and seizures.’”181 He agreed with the
majority that the balancing inquiry enunciated by the Court in Bell is the
standard of reasonableness to be applied.182 He stated that “the place, scope
and manner” of the “particular intrusion” was a serious “invasion of per-
sonal rights” as it involves “a stranger peering without consent at a naked
individual, and in particular at the most private portions of that person’s
body . . . .”183
Justice Breyer determined that the procedures at issue in Florence were
an unjustified violation of the Fourth Amendment prohibition of unrea-
sonable searches and seizures.184 He described the privacy interests in ques-
tion as “demeaning, dehumanizing, undignified, humiliating, terrifying,
unpleasant, embarrassing, and repulsive, signifying degradation and sub-
mission.”185 At the same time, his dissent recognized the penological in-
terests advanced by the majority—“(1) to detect injuries or diseases, such
as lice, which might spread in confinement, (2) to identify gang tattoos,
which might reflect a need for special housing to avoid violence, and (3) to
detect contraband, including drugs, guns, knives, and even pens or chew-
ing gum”186—and acknowledged that the job of correctional officials “is
177. Id. at 1525 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. (emphasis added) (In concluding that absent reasonable suspicion there is no sup-
port in the Constitution for such searches, Justice Breyer defines minor offenses as those such as
“traffic offenses, a regulatory offense[s], an essentially civil matter, or any other such
misdemeanor.”).
181. Id. at 1525-26.
182. Id. at 1526 (internal citations omitted).
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. (citing Mary Beth G. v. Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263, 1272 (7th Cir. 1984)).
186. Id. at 1527.
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an inordinately difficult undertaking.”187 The dissent deferred to correc-
tional facilities to some extent, affirming that regulations that “interfere
with important constitutional interests are generally valid as long as they
are ‘reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.’ ”188
Keeping in mind the interests of all individuals and institutions in-
volved, his dissent found nothing, absent reasonable suspicion of wrongdo-
ing, demonstrating that the penological interests at issue in Florence are
reasonable.189  Instead, Justice Breyer pointed out the unreasonableness and
irrelevance of the County’s intake procedures.190 In particular, he stated
that “there is no connection between the genital lift and the ‘squat and
cough’ that Florence was allegedly subjected to and health or gang con-
cerns.”191 Justice Breyer noted empirical data indicating that despite the
“large number of inmates” at the facilities in question, there were very few
instances that officers discovered contraband at intake.192 Finally, Justice
Breyer highlighted the opinions of professional bodies, practices of correc-
tional facilities and laws in many states193 to demonstrate that the peno-
logical interests advanced by the majority were unnecessary to advance
security interests and were thus inconsistent with the application of the
reasonable suspicion standard.194
D. Beyond Florence
In finding that the invasive strip searches performed on Albert Flo-
rence were constitutionally reasonable and struck the proper balance be-
tween individual privacy and institutional security,195 the Court cemented
the practice of performing invasive visual and/or body cavity searches on
every arrestee being introduced into general population.196 The Court
thus alerted every correctional institution that in the context of strip search
procedures, minor crimes warranted no differentiation from serious
crimes. Everyone from the soccer mom to the drug dealer was to be con-
sidered potentially diseased or concealing contraband.197
187. Id.
188. Id. at 1527-28.
189. Id. at 1528, 1531.
190. Id. (Justice Breyer cited searches such as “(a) pat-frisking all inmates; (b) making in-
mates go through metal detectors (including the Body Orifice Screening System (BOSS) chair
used at Essex County Correctional Facility that identifies metal hidden within the body); (c)
making inmates shower and use particular delousing agents or bathing supplies; and (d) searching
inmates’ clothing.”).
191. Id.
192. Id. at 1528-29.
193. Id. at 1529-30.
194. Id. at 1528-31.
195. Id. at 1523.
196. Id.
197. See id.
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The great deference that the Court extended to correctional facilities
to strip search anyone as long as the search is “related to legitimate peno-
logical interests”198 serves as the final nail in the coffin of the longstanding
constitutional pillar that reasonable articulable suspicion is necessary for deten-
tions and searches.199 Clearly, the Court’s understanding of the dignity and
respect reserved for all citizens, even those arrested and facing general de-
tention, has devolved since that body first declared that a strip search must,
like any other search . . . be limited to that which is necessary.”200 A dan-
gerous tradition of deference has replaced “a constitutional balance be-
tween governmental interests and the private interests of individuals.”201
The next section will analyze Florence in light of the disparate racial
outcomes present in the criminal justice system and indicate that the
Court’s unwillingness to require individualized suspicion of the commis-
sion of a serious offense or the concealment of a weapon or drugs impacts
those who come into contact with the criminal justice system. This is
particularly true for racial minorities who are disproportionately repre-
sented at every stage of our criminal justice system. Florence moves us
further away from equality and instead contributes to polarizing communi-
ties of color.
III. ANALYSIS OF FLORENCE IN THE CONTEXT OF COLORBLIND
RACISM IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
Florence should be read in the context of a criminal justice system that
continues to have a disproportionately negative effect on Black and Latino
communities, in order to recognize its practical impact on these minority
communities.  For example, despite the fact that all races and ethnicities
commit crime,202 the police stop Blacks and Latinos at rates that are much
higher than whites. In major urban areas like New York City, where peo-
ple of color make up approximately half of the population, the police
stopped Blacks and Latinos eighty percent of the time. Moreover, when
Whites were stopped, only eight percent were frisked. In contrast, when
Blacks and Latinos were stopped, eighty-five percent were frisked.203
198. Id. at 1511.
199. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968).
200. Id. at 25-26; see also Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310 (1967) (Fortas, J.,
concurring).
201. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30-31.
202. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS: ARRESTS BY
RACE (2012), https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2012/crime-in-the-
u.s.-2012/tables/43tabledatadecoverviewpdf.
203. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 573-76 (2013) (“Officers are re-
quired to complete a UF-250 form, also known as a ‘Stop, Question and Frisk Report Work-
sheet,’ after each Terry stop. Each side of the form contains checkboxes and fields in which
officers are required to indicate the nature of the stop and the circumstances that led to and
justified the stop (the ‘stop factors’).”).
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Despite the fact that minorities experience policing differently, the
language of Florence ostensibly extends the ‘blanket’ strip search powers of
police in a nondiscriminatory fashion. However, social science literature is
overwhelmingly decisive in showing how, post-Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion,204 de jure race neutrality in regulatory language does not necessarily
result in a corresponding equal outcome among various races. In fact, so-
cial science and legal analyses overwhelmingly demonstrate that although
de jure discrimination and state supported discrimination have largely been
abandoned, de facto discrimination proliferates.205
Bonilla-Silva has theorized that the Court’s inability to identify dis-
criminatory intent in the context of de facto segregation is a product of a
new, post-Jim Crow racial reality known as “color blind racism.”206  Fur-
ther, Bonilla-Silva explained that while White actors appear ‘‘reasonable’’
and even ‘‘moral,’’ they effectively oppose almost all practical jurispruden-
tial approaches to combat de facto racial inequality. Unlike de jure discrimi-
nation, de facto discrimination “practices [are] subtle, institutional, and
apparently nonracial.”207  The focus on intentional discrimination by bad
actors, while ignoring substantial racial disparities in outcomes, is an un-
tenable jurisprudential position.  This approach results in the legalization
and legitimization of statutes and regulations by the courts that continue to
oppress and humiliate racial minorities, specifically Blacks and Latinos.
Other legal analyses of Florence208 have largely ignored, and hence
minimized, the salience of race when thinking about strip searches, poten-
tially precluding lower courts from considering this literature. Nonetheless,
law enforcement agencies with the discretion to write their policies and
monitor their own practices should take this literature into consideration.
Analyses of discriminatory use of strip search policy are limited,
given that there are few reliable sources and no uniform policy mandates
the collecting and reporting of such data. As John Gibeaut noted, “Only a
handful of states keep records on the number of minority searches.”209 In
the United Kingdom, however, which has been adopting U.S.-style polic-
ing tactics including discriminatory stop and search practices, Closed Cir-
cuit Television (“CCTV”) installed in police stations has allowed more
204. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
205. Kimberly Grace, Note, De Facto Segregation: How it is Affecting America’s Inner City
Schools. 1 LINCOLN L. REV. 183 (1994) (examining the history of slavery, de jure and de facto
discrimination in our educational system, and the social, economic, and political effects on chil-
dren and schools.)
206. See BONILLA-SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS, supra note 5, at 2.
207. See id. at 28.
208. See generally Daphne Ha, Note, Blanket Policies for Strip Searching Pretrial Detainees: An
Interdisciplinary Argument for Reasonableness, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2721, 2721-60 (2011).
209. John Gibeaut, Marked for Humiliation, 85 A.B.A. J. 46, 47 (1999).
80 Michigan Journal of Race & Law [VOL. 21:55
detailed records of strip searches to be kept.210 Researchers showed that in
police stations, strip-search powers were used disproportionately against
Afro-Caribbean arrestees, holding factors like sex, age, reason for arrest,
and charge constant.211 Although we do not have the advantage of CCTV
and reliable statistics in the United States, we can glean from some sources
the way in which strip-search policies have been imposed discriminatorily.
Teresa Miller reasoned that Florence’s arrest and subsequent strip
search were partially due to the police’s over-reliance on technological ad-
vances.212 According to Miller, the statewide computer database incor-
rectly reflected an outstanding warrant for Florence.213 Mistakes like this
are not uncommon, as police officers use disparate sources such as the
National Crime Information Center (NCIC). The NCIC reports civil im-
migration violations in addition to criminal offenses, and state police
budgets often do not allow for the contemporaneous updating of police
databases.214 She points out that research has shown that forty-two percent
of all NCIC immigration ‘hits’ were false positives, a situation often re-
peated at airports.215
Miller’s piece is compelling, but it fails to properly recognize the in-
sidious role of race. Technology is not race/ethnicity neutral.  To elabo-
rate, Latinos are more likely to be stopped and subjected to strip searches if
officers do not take extra steps to confirm the validity of systems reporting
the names of illegal immigrants as false positives are more likely to be trig-
gered by Hispanic last names.216
Miller noted that the unfounded ‘fearmongering’ about the danger-
ousness of those who have been accused of violating even minor criminal
laws resulting from Florence is similar to the fearmongering propagated dur-
ing the War on Drugs. She wrote, “Fear-mongering during the War on
Drugs was a conscious strategy by politicians on both sides of the aisle,
corporations, and the media to exploit the anxieties of the middle-class in
210. Tim Newburn, Michael Shiner & Stephanie Hayman, Race, Crime and Injustice? Strip
Search and the Treatment of Suspects in Custody, 44 BRIT. J. CRIMINOL 677, 679-80 (2004).
211. Id. at 677 (“In recent years, police use of ‘stop and search’ has emerged as a key area of
concern. The disproportionate application of this power against young black men has been de-
scribed as ‘the most glaring example of an abuse of police powers’ and . . . ‘nothing has been
more damaging to the relationship between the police and the black community than the ill-
judged use of stop and search powers.’”) (internal citations omitted).
212. Teresa A. Miller, Bright Lines, Black Bodies: The Florence Strip Search Case and Its Dire
Repercussions, 46 AKRON L. REV. 433, 456 (2013).
213. Id.
214. Id. at 459-60.
215. Id. at 461.
216. See id. (“[W]e are all too familiar with the scenario in which unsuspecting travelers
are routinely flagged at airports because their names match or resemble one on the federal terror-
ist watch list.”).
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order to achieve numerous objectives including winning elections, selling
real estate in gated communities, etc. . . .”217
Again, absent from this discussion is the way in which policing dur-
ing the War on Drugs resulted in the mass incarceration of men of color in
spite of seemingly race-neutral legislation. The result of racialized
fearmongering during the War on Drugs foreshadowed how colorblind
legislation in the context of strip searches may similarly impact minority
communities. While it is certainly the case that socioeconomic status is a
strong predictor of likelihood to be arrested for drug offenses, proof that
race in addition to class has been salient abounds. Kenneth Nunn’s “Race,
Crime and the Pool of Surplus Criminality: Or Why the ‘War on Drugs’
was a ‘War on Blacks’” argues, “The War on Drugs has had a devastating
effect on African American communities nationwide. Throughout the
drug war, African Americans have been disproportionately investigated,
detained, searched, arrested and charged with the use, possession and sale
of illegal drugs” in spite of drug use less than or equal to that of Whites.218
This reality has been copiously noted elsewhere.
Miller’s treatment of race is more explicitly discussed primarily in
terms of symbolism.219 She makes a compelling argument that “current
strip searches are remarkably similar to the way slaves were treated on the
auction block.”220 Her metaphor—the degradation of Blacks on the auc-
tion block and under the eyes of law enforcement—is apt.221 Yet this sym-
bolism does not describe how institutionalized racism impacts strip
searches. Although the argument about the metaphorical significance of
strip searches is compelling, it does not provide a clear sense of the way in
which strip-searching fits seamlessly with other discriminatory criminal
justice practices. It is not merely a glaring, incongruent barbarity, but a
result of institutionalized racism in the criminal justice system.
Similarly, Daphne Ha’s assertion that “research shows that giving po-
lice officers discretion to conduct strip searches may increase the chance of
racial, gender, ethnic, or other forms of discrimination,”222 while correct,
seems naı̈ve and understated.
In his article for the ABA Journal, John Gibeaut described cases in
which Blacks have been targeted without reasonable suspicion at airports,
217. Id. at 469.
218. Kenneth B. Nunn, Race, Crime and the Pool of Surplus Criminality: Or Why the “War on
Drugs” Was a “War on Blacks,” 6 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 381, 381 (2002).
219. See Miller, supra note 212, at 464.
220. Id.
221. See id. at 464-65 (“Kennedy’s defense of the practice of strip-searching detainees is
premised on the interest of jailers in reducing the risk that detainees present to the facility and its
occupants due to uncertainties about their health, injuries, gang affiliations, and propensity for
violence. This mirrors exactly the premises of the slave merchants in the slave pens.”).
222. Ha, supra note 208, at 2758 (emphasis added).
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such as Chicago’s O’Hare, for invasive strip searches.223 Black women in
particular have fallen victim to the discriminatory searches, as evidenced
by the eighty-five lawsuits brought in federal court.224 Also, because Cus-
toms does report strip searches, data from the late nineties showed that
sixty percent of those who were strip searched at airports were Black or
Latino—a gross overrepresentation when, as Gibeaut points out, some es-
timates say that these two groups make up as little as five percent of those
traveling.225 In one example Gibeaut described, Patricia Appleton likened
the experience of being strip searched to being raped.226 Indeed, this sense
of violation produced accords well with Miller’s slavery analogy.
Not only are adults subjected to discriminatory strip searches, but
Black and Latino schoolchildren are often subjected to arbitrary discipline
as well.227 For example, investigative reporting by the Chicago Tribune in
2012 revealed that these minority groups were more likely to be referred
to the police for infractions, arrested, and suspended than their White
counterparts.228 These practices fuel the school-to-prison pipeline,
wherein minority youth are channeled out of school and into the criminal
justice system.229 It is not surprising, then, that Dennis Parker described in
his study of strip searches at school that “[f]or many students, frequently
students of color and often students with troubled disciplinary records, in-
trusive searches can be more the rule than the exception.”230 Moreover, he
found that “[a]lthough these searches may be motivated by the desire to
create a safe environment in the schools, the manner in which they are
carried out can be ineffective or even counterproductive and may result in
the creation of a school environment that more closely resembles a prison
than an institution of learning.”231 Dennis Parker documented studies of
“policies and practices which did not appear to either serve the overall
goals of student safety or protect the privacy and dignity of individual
students.”232
223. Gibeaut, supra note 209, at 46-48.
224. Id. at 46 (citing data from when the article was published in 1999, as more recent data
has not been disseminated).
225. Id. at 47.
226. Id. at 46.
227. Diane Rado, Punishment unequal in area schools, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 26, 2012, at 1, 9.
228. Id.
229. See id.
230. Dennis D. Parker, Discipline in Schools After Safford Unified School District #1 v.
Redding, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1023, 1028 (2009-2010).
231. Id.
232. Id. at 1028-29 (referring to a joint report by the New York Civil Liberties Union and
the Racial Justice Project of the National ACLU).  The report “examined a host of security
practices involving police and school resource officers and the use of metal detectors in New
York City schools. The report is filled with examples of security practices that adversely affect
the educational environment and alienate teachers and, on many occasions, the educational staff
at the schools. Examples included the search of a New York City high school in which dozens of
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Fortunately, the 2009 decision in Safford Unified School District #1 v.
Redding extends some measure of protection to minors against unreasona-
ble searches.233 The Court, ruling in favor of the thirteen-year-old female
plaintiff, who was strip-searched under suspicion of possessing prescription
drugs, emphasized that the age of the child should motivate restraint when
using such methods.234 However, given that implicit biases affect law en-
forcement officers’ perception of criminal behavior, it is unlikely that even
with reasonable suspicion being a necessary prerequisite to a strip search of
a child, law enforcement will cease to perform searches in a discriminatory
manner.
As noted, there is little available evidence about the demographics of
strip-searching. Nevertheless, even if there were extensive documentation
of bias, “Generally, courts have refused to disallow the use of race as an
indicia of criminality. Most courts have accepted this practice, so long as
(1) race alone is not the rationale for the interdiction, and (2) it is not done
for the purposes of racial harassment.”235
Racial profiling in policing has not been explicitly declared unconsti-
tutional. In the context of sentencing, it has not been accepted as a ratio-
nale for mitigating punishment. In McCleskey v. Kemp (1987), a Black
defendant convicted of robbery and murder of a White police officer filed
a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.236 He alleged that his constitutional
right to equal protection had been violated during his sentencing pro-
cess.237 He claimed that he would not have been sentenced to death if not
for his race.238 He cited statistical evidence produced by David Baldus
(“The Baldus Study”)239 that showed Blacks who killed White victims are
much more likely to receive death sentence than in any other victim-of-
fender demographic pairing.240
police officers and school security agents brought portable metal detectors and handheld wands,
searched the school bags of every student, and subjected students to ‘a steady barrage of yelling
and cursing by the officers.’ After the search, the school’s principal described the effort as having
done more harm than good. He complained that the ‘tone of the building’ was disrupted and
that children were subjected to repeated instances of disrespect. Although the study was com-
pleted before the Redding decision was decided, anecdotal evidence suggests that the decision
has not resulted in any large-scale shifts in the treatment of students by disciplinary schools.” Id.
233. Safford Unified Sch. Dist, #1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 374-79 (2009).
234. Id. at 377-78.
235. Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies, Street Stops and Broken Windows: Terry, Race, and Disor-
der in New York City, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 457, 460 (2000).
236. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 279 (1987).
237. Id. at 286.
238. Id. at 292.
239. Id. at 286-92.
240. Id. at 287 n.5 (explaining the methodology of a statistical analysis conducted by
Professors David Baldus, Charles Pulaski, and George Woodworth, which is known as the Baldus
Study).
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The Court ruled against McCleskey, holding that even if discrimina-
tion influenced sentencing generally, McCleskey failed to show discrimi-
nation was a factor in his particular case.241  Writing for the majority,
Justice Powell wrote, “Because of the risk that the factor of race may enter
the criminal justice process, we have engaged in ‘unceasing efforts’ to erad-
icate racial prejudice from our criminal justice system. Our efforts have
been guided by our recognition that ‘the inestimable privilege of trial by
jury . . . is a vital principle, underlying the whole administration of crimi-
nal justice.’”242  Justice Powell’s refusal to consider definitive evidence that
race influences jury decisions is a prime example of how ignoring such
evidence in jurisprudence — ruling colorblind — can be lethal.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
In Florence, the Court held that unless Albert Florence could demon-
strate that conducting invasive strip searches of every detainee admitted to
general population was an unnecessary and unjustified response to the
problems of jail security, there was no constitutional violation.243 The
Court further held that irrespective of level of suspicion and offense, the
invasive strip search procedures conducted in Florence “struck a reasonable
balance between inmate privacy and the needs of the [correctional] insti-
tutions.”244 In so holding, the Court once again determined that the “ex-
pertise and judgment” necessary to make such decisions should be
exercised not by courts, but deference be given to correctional officials.
The Florence ruling, even without the existence of institutionalized
racism, should be severely rebuked as one of the worst examples of judicial
capitulation. But given the current reality in the United States of contin-
ued inequality at all stages of the criminal justice system, the circumstances
are even more exigent. To be clear, nothing short of the idealistic eradica-
tion of institutionalized racism would equalize the disparate impact of strip
search policy. Nevertheless, there are ways to minimize the harm done by
this ruling. In giving unlimited discretion to correctional institutions and
officials to determine the reasonableness of practices, the Court has diluted
the reasonableness standard announced in Terry to an unrecognizable and
unworkable patchwork of practice conducted institution by institution. I
recommend that the Court, (1) adhere to the reasonable suspicion standard
of particularized wrongdoing where minor offenses are concerned unless
there is particularized suspicion of contraband; (2) Law enforcement and
corrections voluntarily bring their practices and procedures more in line
with the reasonable suspicion requirements of the Fourth Amendment;
241. Id. at 292-94, 297.
242. Id. at 309.
243. Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of the Cnty. of Burlington, 132 S. Ct. 1510,
1523 (2012).
244. Id.
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and (3) activists and non-governmental organizations aggressively advocate
for change in the political arena.
A. Reasonable Suspicion
Terry permits a police officer to intervene when he or she “observes
unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his
experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with
whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous.”245 In applica-
tion, this should certainly require particularized and articulable suspicion
of wrongdoing, especially when a practice as invasive and humiliating as a
strip search is involved.
Throughout the majority opinion in Florence, Justice Kennedy re-
peatedly reiterates the Court’s precedent246 that has afforded great defer-
ence to correctional institutions and officials in carrying out their duties,
including the conducting of searches for contraband.247 The majority
opinion relies almost exclusively on this belief of the deference due to
correctional institutions in determining whether the regulations and prac-
tices of correctional institutions are “reasonably related to legitimate peno-
logical interests,”248 rather than assessing whether the regulations and
practices themselves impinge on a protected constitutional right. For ex-
ample, Justice Kennedy argued that “[t]he difficulties of operating a de-
tention center must not be underestimated by the courts”;249
“[m]aintaining safety and order at these institutions requires the expertise
of correctional officials, who must have substantial discretion to devise rea-
sonable solutions to the problems they face”;250 “there is no mechanical
way to determine whether intrusions on an inmate’s privacy are reasona-
ble”;251 and “[p]eople detained for minor offenses can turn out to be the
most devious and dangerous criminals.”252 This deference obscures the
constitutional violation at play here.
245. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1968).
246. See supra Part II.
247. Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Cnty. of Burlington, 132 S. Ct. 1510,
1515-16 (2012); see also supra Part II.
248. Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1515-16.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 1516.
252. Id. at 1520 (Alito, J., concurring) (“[T]he Court does not hold that it is always rea-
sonable to conduct a full strip search of an arrestee whose detention has not been reviewed by a
judicial officer and who could be held in available facilities apart from the general population.
Most of those arrested for minor offenses are not dangerous, and most are released from custody prior to
or at the time of their initial appearance before a magistrate.”) (emphasis added).
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As Justice Breyer points out in his dissent, the Court has in the past
recognized the degradation of such a practice.253 Other members of the
Court, while refusing to intervene, also acknowledged that such a practice
has significant implications for those exposed.254 Justice Alito and Chief
Justice Roberts, while acknowledging that the majority opinion is limited
and that some individuals should not be subjected to strip searches, never-
theless sign on to it.255 In its zeal to defer to correctional institutions, the
Court declared that holding correctional officials to a reasonable suspicion
standard would be “unworkable.”256
Albert Florence was erroneously arrested, strip searched, and placed
in general population based on a general strip search policy that failed to
distinguish between those who are likely to possess drugs or engage in
violence and those arrested erroneously or arrested for minor infractions
such as traffic offenses. Despite no indication that Florence was violent, the
Court found no violation due to its blind deference to correctional facility
policies. It reasoned that as long as the practice is “reasonably related to
legitimate penological interests,”257 there is no requirement of a finding of
an “unworkable” reasonable suspicion of articulable wrongdoing.258 How-
ever, it is this lack of connection between the regulation and the conduct
of the arrestee that makes the search per se unreasonable pursuant to the
Fourth Amendment.
B. Law Enforcement
It is necessary at the correctional level that strip searches be carried
out in a way that minimizes humiliation and degradation, reduces differen-
tial impact of these negative consequences on Blacks and Hispanics, and
ensures equality in the practice. As law enforcement officers are required to
have a close and practical relationship with the communities they serve,
law enforcement must act in ways to reduce the perception of inequality
and bias. This is particularly true in light of heightened excessive use of
force allegations and shootings of unarmed Black men and the resulting
253. Id. at 1526-27 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“We have recently said, in respect to a school-
child (and a less intrusive search), that the ‘meaning of such a search, and the degradation its
subject may reasonably feel, place a search that intrusive in a category of its own demanding its
own specific suspicions.’” (quoting Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364,
377 (2009)); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 560 (1979) (“We do not underestimate the degree to
which these searches may invade the personal privacy of inmates.”).
254. Id. at 1524 (Alito, J., concurring) (“Undergoing such an inspection is undoubtedly
humiliating and deeply offensive to many, but there are reasonable grounds for strip searching
arrestees before they are admitted to the general population of a jail. As the Court explains, there
is a serious danger that some detainees will attempt to smuggle weapons, drugs, or other contra-
band into the jail.”).
255. Id. at 1523 (Roberts, C.J., concurring); id. at 1524-25 (Alito, J., concurring).
256. Id. at 1520.
257. Id. at 1515-16.
258. Id. at 1520, 1523.
FALL 2015] Strip Searching 87
protests and riots.259 The discretion exercised by law enforcement is sub-
stantial, and the ability of law enforcement to use that discretion to disad-
vantageously arrest and victimize people of color requires that law
enforcement do a better job of policing itself. We as a society must more
closely scrutinize and hold law enforcement accountable when their con-
duct does not meet the rigorous standards of legal and social transparency.
In the context of corrections, the Court has explicitly deferred to the
expertise of corrections officials. Therefore, we must rely on institutional
restraint in the application of strip searches and institutionalize policies that
encompass a reasonable suspicion standard. Without enforcing a clear pol-
icy of reasonable suspicion, a blanket provision to strip search all detainees
will result in gross violations of civil rights and liberties. Although the
Court has ruled strip-searching for even minor infractions is constitution-
ally permissible, corrections officials should use heightened protocols to
ensure that “strip searches” are only done when absolutely necessary. In
other words, law enforcement agencies need not strip search simply be-
cause they can.
Encouragingly, there are extant examples of law enforcement officers
who are actively resisting the implications of Florence. As Sheriff Garry Lu-
cas announced, “Clark County and all jails within the State of Washington
must conduct strip searches consistent with State Law RCW 10.79.”260
State Law RCW 10.79 explicitly states that without a warrant, strip
searches are not permissible except in cases where reasonable suspicion ex-
ists that the person is carrying contraband and the correctional facility is at
risk or the person has engaged in crimes that would suggest he or she is
likely to be carrying contraband.261 In Albany, New York, the police are
going beyond the minimum requirements required by the law.262 Follow-
ing a damaging report about strip searches in the Albany Times Union,263
the police in 2013 decided to draft more stringent rules requiring reasona-
ble suspicion, the searching of the person in a discreet location at the po-
lice station unless there is a “serious risk to safety,” and that the person be
under arrest.264
Regardless of whether the lowered standards of Florence are followed,
police departments should implement changes to their strip-search proto-
259. See Excessive or reasonable force by police? Research on law enforcement and racial conflict,
JOURNALIST’S RES. CTR. (Oct. 29, 2015), http://journalistsresource.org/studies/government/
criminal-justice/police-reasonable-force-brutality-race-research-review-statistics.
260. John Branton, Supreme Court ruling on strip searches won’t change protocol at county jail,
THE COLUMBIAN (Apr. 11, 2012), http://www.columbian.com/news/2012/apr/11/strip-
searches-ok-in-jails-anytime-says-us-supreme/.
261. Id.; see also Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 10.79.130 (West).
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cols. In many instances, police departments do not keep records of the
number of strip searches conducted, the reasons why they were conducted,
the results of the searches, or any type of demographic data about the peo-
ple searched. Like police departments in the United Kingdom, police de-
partments in the United States should begin keeping records and
evaluating them. In the case of the Albany police department, an exposé
would have been impossible without the existence of records. These
records should be made publicly available, and a task force should be as-
signed by the state legislature to review the results and recommend policy
changes. Public hearings about the impact of strip searches on individuals
and the community may be necessary to effectuate important reforms. As a
report to the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and In-
human or Degrading Treatment or Punishment stated, “Allegations of ra-
cial bias, with media disclosure and Senate hearings, led US Customs to
revise rules and issue a Personal Search Handbook, with details on approval
of searches, selection criteria, registration, outside contact by those
delayed, removal to a medical facility etc. ‘Diversity training’ is offered to
customs officials to prevent racial discrimination.”265
Personal search handbooks and diversity training will not ensure the
prevention of racial discrimination in strip searches. However, combined
with an emphasis on the importance of reasonable suspicion, such guides
would be a promising start in ensuring that increasingly large numbers of
people, particularly Black and Hispanic people, are not subjected to the
traumatic effects of strip searches. The types of protocol initiated by the
Albany and Clark County police should be emulated widely in the United
States. Unfortunately, the patchwork nature of criminal justice policy and
state politics in no way guarantees their widespread adoption.
C. Social Movements, NGOs, and Concerned Citizens
The Obama administration supported the Florence decision, once
again highlighting the importance of recognizing the fallacy of a post-racial
reality premised on the election of a Black president. Non-governmental
organizations, civil rights groups, and criminal justice non-profits with so-
cial justice mission statements have a unique role to play in a post-Florence
milieu. Although the Supreme Court has declared that reasonable suspi-
cion is no longer necessary to initiate a search, the outcome does not have
to be a race to the bottom. Elected representatives in state legislatures do
not need to modify existing law, nor do law enforcement agencies need to
change their protocols, which have previously enshrouded reasonable sus-
picion. In fact, they can demonstrate resistance to Florence by adopting (as
the Albany police did) stricter parameters, they can attempt to better train
265. Petur Hauksson, Body Searches: The Problems and Guidelines, EUROPEAN COMM. FOR
THE PREVENTION OF TORTURE AND INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISH-
MENT (2001), http://www.cpt.coe.int/en/working-documents/cpt-2001-66-eng.pdf.
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their police to be aware of racial profiling, and they can create databases
through which to monitor patterns of searching and conduct reviews of
policy. However, there will be little impetus for the police and legislature
to pursue these courses of action without pressure from their constituents,
members of social justice and civil rights nonprofits, and guidance from
these agencies.
There has been a small degree of discernible movement for advocates
and NGOs to take interest generally on strip searches conducted by the
police, including, prominently, through the American Civil Liberties
Union (ACLU) and National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People (NAACP). In 2006, for example, the NAACP and ACLU jointly
filed a class action lawsuit alleging that the Baltimore police department
was conducting strip searches of arrestees without probable cause or rea-
sonable suspicion that they were carrying contraband, which is a “violation
of the . . . Maryland Declaration of Rights.”266 The ACLU-NJ, prior to
the Florence ruling, filed an amicus brief on behalf of five former New
Jersey Attorneys General, opposing the blanket strip search policies of the
Burlington County Jail and Essex County Correctional Facility.”267 Fur-
thermore, the New York Civil Liberties Union worked with the Albany
police to draft new, stricter rules for their strip-searches in 2013.268
These examples, however, were not carried out directly in response
to the Florence ruling. There has been no apparent response by the ACLU,
NAACP, or other civil rights/social justice organizations that directly op-
poses the decreased search standard and organizes constituents to lobby
their legislators or demand that local law enforcement evince transparency
in their use of searches and abide by a reasonable suspicion standard. This is
a mistake. In the same way that New York’s Stop and Frisk policy became
a rallying point as evidence of its racial bias surfaced, the much more inva-
sive and traumatizing policy of strip searching without reasonable suspi-
cion, which disproportionately impacts people of color in spite of its
seeming race-neutrality. The emergence of grassroots watchdog groups
such as People’s Justice for Community Control is encouraging, but these
groups must not only focus their attention on acts of police brutality that
are able to be recorded in the streets; they should also track those that take
place behind closed doors.
266. Justin Fenton, Agree with state on suit alleging improper strip searches arrests, THE BALTI-
MORE SUN (Feb. 26, 2010), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2010-02-26/news/bal-md.ci.set
tlement26feb26_1_strip-searches-mass-arrests-city-jail.
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Search Policy, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF NEW JERSEY, https://aclu-nj.org/legal
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CONCLUSION
Nothing short of overturning Florence would enable the application
of the reasonable suspicion standard to the strip-searching of arrestees. The
standard the Court has established in Florence departs from the post-Terry
requirement of law enforcement to adhere, at a minimum, to reasonable
suspicion to engage in searches and seizures, and creates broad deference to
law enforcement and correctional institutions largely unhinged from judi-
cial review.  The Court has held that prisoners are not beyond the reach of
the Constitution,269 yet makes the Constitution inapplicable when those
most vulnerable need its protections most.  This situation is untenable and
can only be rectified by a strict adherence to constitutional principles al-
ready established, particularly those governing the use of law enforcement
power to arrest and supervise during corrections.
Stricter adherence to reasonable suspicion is necessary to ensure that
searches are documented and conducted sparingly. Social movements can
demand fairness and transparency to help minimize disparities in the appli-
cation of strip searches. In an era marked by colorblind racism in policy
and practice, disparities cannot be abolished entirely. Yet, there is hope for
conscious recognition of the institutionalized racial bias that played a role
in the Florence ruling and that continues to play a role in other aspects of
our criminal justice system. This recognition must produce action by law
enforcement and concerned citizens to enable steady progress toward the
ideal criminal justice system, untarnished by racial bias.  Without this rec-
ognition and active, persistent efforts to overcome bias in our criminal
justice system, we can never hope to achieve justice, equality, and liberty
for all.
269. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974).
